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Introduction 
Over the past fifteen or so years inter-governmental organisations, states and civil society 
organisations have openly acknowledged the threat to development from the corrupt activities 
of public officials, politicians and multinational companies (MNCs). This link between 
corruption and development has been underlined by the World Bank thus: 
 
[I]t is not just the financial damage from fraud and corruption that should be of 
concern to us. It is the fact that corruption sets in motion a chain of events that can 
wreak havoc on a development project. The money to pay a bribe must come from 
some part of the project; as a result, prices may be raised, and/ or quality and 
performance lowered. Less qualified bidders win by bid rigging while qualified 
bidders become discouraged and stop bidding. In addition, citizen awareness of 
unchallenged corruption undermines trust in government and public institutions, 
which leads to acquiescence to poor quality and performance in public services and 
infrastructure – and to an unwillingness to report fraud and corruption. All of these 
effects must be considered when we assess the true impact of corruption on publicly 
financed projects.3 
 
Economists have also highlighted the detrimental impact of corruption on development. 
According to Mauro4 and Shleifer and Vishny5 corruption impedes economic growth, which 
in turn affects development. Dreher and Herzfeld’s study also confirms this negative impact 
of corruption on development. According to their survey ‘an increase of corruption by about 
one index point [on the International Country Risk Guide] reduces GDP growth by 0.13 
                                                        
1
 Research Professor in Law, University of Surrey 
2
 Senior Lecturer, University of Surrey 
3
 The World Bank Group Annual Report on Investigations and Sanctions of Staff Misconduct and Fraud 
and Corruption in Bank-Financed Projects Fiscal Year 2004 Washington DC: The World Bank, 2004. 
4
 Mauro, P  ‘Corruption and Growth’ (1995) Quarterly Journal of Economics  60(3): 681. 
5
 Shleifer, A and Vishny,   ‘Corruption’ (1993) Quarterly Journal of Economics  108(3) 599. 
 2
percentage points and GDP per capita by 425 US$’.6 The reduction in economic growth 
means more poverty. A cross-national analysis of 56 countries by Gupta et al found that there 
is poverty alleviation only when there is higher growth. 7  Given the close link between 
corruption, economic growth and development, and poverty alleviation it should come as no 
surprise that the international community sees combating corruption as a key priority. The 
first step towards combating corruption was (1) the adoption of conventions that would bring 
about harmonization of anti-corruption laws at a global level and (2) the formulation of soft 
law instruments promoting responsible behaviour on the part of businesses.8  
 
Amongst those engaged in the drafting of the treaties are international and regional 
organisations such as the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe and the African 
Union. There are therefore too many anti-corruption treaties9 to analyse here in any detail.10 
Instead brief references are made  to some of the anti-corruption conventions to provide some 
idea of their scope. All of them at a minimum require Contracting States to criminalize the 
giving of bribes thus focusing on the supply side of bribes. The Anti-bribery Convention 
drafted by the OECD for instance focuses solely on the supply side of bribes since it was 
primarily drafted to combat the widespread practice of bribing public officials by the private 
sector to obtain lucrative business contracts abroad. The other conventions go further 
requiring contracting states to criminalize the demand of bribes (soliciting of bribes), 
embezzlement, trading in influence and money laundering. The UNCAC  covers all these 
aspects. 
 
An interesting observation however in relation to all of the anti-corruption conventions is that 
they do not make any distinction between petty corruption or grand corruption and therefore 
do not require the contracting states to make such a distinction when implementing the 
convention upon ratification. In other words the conventions do not make a distinction 
between payment of US$ 100 as a bribe to a passport officer to obtain a passport quickly  
(petty corruption) and the payment of US$ 100,000 as a bribe to a public official for obtaining 
a lucrative contract (grand corruption). Both these acts are covered by the same offence. 
These treaties do not view grand corruption and petty corruption differently though much of 
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the scholarly writings do. Grand corruption is generally understood to be corruption that takes 
place at the upper reaches of society involving the political elite, public officials, middle men 
and the private sector. For instance, corruption in arms deals is an illustration of grand 
corruption.11 Petty corruption, on the other hand, is normally understood to be corruption 
faced by citizens and the private sector on a daily basis to receive basic services such as 
connections to utilities, obtaining passports, school admission and customs formalities. As 
opposed to grand corruption that involves millions of dollars, petty corruption is ignored 
largely in corruption related research. This could perhaps be attributed to the belief that it 
does not impact on development and the provision of infrastructures the way grand corruption 
does. The scant attention may also be driven by the view that if grand corruption is reduced 
this in turn would have a knock on effect on petty corruption. As to whether this will be the 
case is highly debatable. This paper therefore focuses on petty corruption and argues that it 
also undermines development and examines the use of Information Technology (IT) 
creatively to reduce opportunities for engaging in petty corruption. Section A examines the 
nature of petty corruption and the opportunity creating environments. Section B examines the 
link between corruption and development and Section C focuses on whether IT could be a 
useful resource in combating corruption. For this purpose, examples from Commonwealth 
countries in Africa (Kenya, Ghana) and in Asia (India, Pakistan) to illustrate the modus 
operandi of petty corruption. We chose these countries since they figure as highly corrupt in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.12  Further, given India’s unique 
position amongst the emerging economies in the IT sector13 it was felt that it would be useful 
to assess critically their experience of using IT in providing public services through the highly 
acclaimed Bhoomi project14. 
 
A. Petty Corruption – Its Nature  
What is Petty Corruption? 
A useful staring for a discussion of the nature of petty corruption is Doig’s definition. For 
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Doig [p]etty corruption is the soliciting or extortion of small payments by low level officials 
in order to expedite business by cutting through red tape; or to do what they are supposed to 
do anyway.15 The key to this type of corruption is that it tends to involve junior level officials 
who abuse their position to levy a form of arbitrary ‘tax’ against those who find themselves in 
need of various services.  It is deemed arbitrary because it is often accepted as a way of life in 
the obtaining of basic goods and services. 16  These arbitrary taxes are often required to 
facilitate the hastening of a bureaucratic process. 17  The process may be complex or 
cumbersome involving many government departments. Small payments often referred to as 
‘grease’, ensures the wheels of service, continue to function properly.18 Such a description 
tends to suggest that they are a necessity and part of the fabric of society.19 We however 
disagree with this view since petty corruption impacts both the individual and social 
development.20  
 
At the individual level the victims of petty corruption find themselves engaging with 
bureaucrats who may assist them with the payment of duties for export, an application for a 
government benefit, or the filing an appropriate tax return.21 These examples from everyday 
life demonstrate its pervasive character thus affecting almost every citizen in the state, 
regardless of their class or status. Bureaucrats do not exclude the poorer sections of society 
from their corrupt practices and in some cases, it seems, the poor pay more than the general 
population. Paul and Shan’s interesting survey in India showed for instance that in Bangalore 
33% of the poor paid bribes to public officials for government services compared to 14% of 
the non-poor. This difference may be due to higher illiteracy amongst the poor and the form-
filling that is a core factor in the obtaining of even the simplest government service such as 
health care. The impact of petty corruption is devastating. This has prompted Riley to suggest 
that ‘we should judge petty corruption from the point of view of the poorest people in poor 
countries’.22 While in the 1990s petty corruption may have affected only the poor, it has 
become even more pervasive and affects all classes except that middle and upper middle-
income groups may have more resources at their disposal to make the payments to corrupt 
public officials.  Based on a sample of 14,405 respondents from 151 cities and 306 villages of 
twenty states in India, Transparency International India’s (TII) study in 200523 estimates that 
‘common citizens of the country pay a bribe of INR 21,068 crores24 while availing one or 
more of the eleven public services in a year. As high as 62 per cent of citizens think that the 
corruption is not a hearsay, but they, in fact, have had first hand experience of paying a bribe 
or “using a contact” to get a job done in a public office.’25 The survey looked at eleven public 
services police (crime/traffic), judiciary (lower courts),land administration, municipal 
services, government run hospitals, electricity (consumers), PDS (ration card/supplies), 
income tax (individual assessees), water supply, schools and rural financial institutions 
(farmers).  
 
TII followed this with another study in 2008, this time focusing on below the poverty line 
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(BPL) households.26  The survey with a sample size of 22,728 randomly selected across the 
States found for instance that 40% of the households who had approached police services and 
land and housing services had paid a bribe.  The study estimates the total bribes by BPL 
households paid to the eleven services in the previous year at INR 8,830 million.  
 
This high level of petty corruption faced by the citizens to access public services is not 
peculiar to India. Surveys relating to Ghana and Kenya also indicate a high percentage of 
citizens paying bribes to avail themselves of public services. According to a survey in Ghana  
conducted in 2011, 78.8% of the respondents had to pay a bribe for utilities such as water and 
electricity and 64.8% paid a bribe for accessing health services and education.27 A similar 
trend is also reported from Kenya which reports that 36.1% of those seeking public services 
were solicited for a bribe and of these 41% paid the bribe.28 A survey conducted by TI  Kenya 
in 2013 also reports the high percentage of bribe paying  and states that between 50-74.9% of 
the respondents had paid bribes in the previous year.29 
 
What emerges from these surveys is that corruption is a serious issue faced by citizens in 
everyday life thus affecting both their quality of life and  rights.  The poor fare worse in this 
context since they cannot afford to access to basic rights such as water and health (guaranteed 
by the Constitution of their State) due to their inability to pay bribes. In these situations the 
State instead of being a protector becomes a predator. So what causes petty corruption and are 
there any shortcomings in the public administration system that could be corrected, improved 
to lower its incidence? 
 
Causes of Petty Corruption 
According to Poeschi and Ribiero  petty corruption is more frequent in less developed 
countries. 30  The key cause appears to be where those who are appointed to these low level 
bureaucratic roles are underpaid and find themselves able, due to opportunity, to exercise this 
power over citizens in their securing of basic services. Bureaucracy has historically been seen 
as a tool for good and certainly a necessary remedy for corruption. The Weberian ideal, which 
fixed the terms for recruitment and employment in office holding, along with ensuring 
satisfactory levels of pay, arguably minimizes the incidence of petty corruption because the 
prospect of loss deters those who might consider it as a feasible course of action. 31 However 
it seems in many countries that have adopted the Weberian bureaucratic model petty 
corruption is still an every day occurrence and this is probably because they do not meet all 
the conditions within the Weberian model, the prominent one being satisfactory wages.  The 
Weberian model assumes that states have the capacity to pay good wages to their bureaucrats 
and monitor their performance. In developing countries this is certainly not the case and it 
should come as no surprise that low level officials demand informal payments from citizens 
for the provision of public services. States also seem to turn a blind eye to such practices. 
This may be either due to corruption (political corruption) at the higher levels of the state 
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machinery or as Sundell states lawmakers may tolerate  ‘informal payments to bureaucrats 
since it is one way of financing the state’. Using the 19th century as an illustration he shows 
that informal payments over time were standardized thus imparting predictability for citizens. 
Over time these directed payments were substituted with ‘fixed salaries for bureaucrats, 
financed by user fees’.32 These user fees normally in the form of stamp tax were subsequently 
replaced by income tax. The idea of formal user fees  as a means of curbing corruption has 
found some favour in recent times.33 The results are mixed. According to Barber, Bonnet and 
Bekedam user fees introduced in the Cambodian health service increased the utilization of the 
services and curbed  the practice of ‘under-the-table-payments’.34 However the experiences in 
Africa are different and indicate under utilization of the services by the poor.35  
 
Conducive Circumstances for Petty Corruption 
To combat petty corruption it is important not only to understand the causes of corruption but 
also the circumstances that are conducive to this activity. A study of the cases provided by 
surveys suggests that complex or cumbersome bureaucratic structures, geographical 
conditions, monopoly and lack of alternative solutions and poor governance create the 
necessary climate for engaging in corruption. We pick on a few illustrations below to show 
how petty corruption takes place in practice. 
 
The transport sector is highly prone to corruption due to the presence of numerous 
checkpoints on the highways and border controls where there is inter-state or international 
transportation of goods. A study by Foltz and Bromley36 examined petty corruption in West 
African trucking, in particular  the use of highways between Mali, Burkina Faso, Togo and 
Ghana to deliver basic goods to these countries. Since Burkina Faso and Mali are landlocked 
and Togo and Ghana only have sea borders to the south traders are dependent on the 
highways.  The roads have regular checkpoints and barriers, which require the drivers to stop. 
At these stops an official or officials control the destination of the goods on the truck thus 
placing these officials in a powerful and monopolistic position. The driver is required to hand 
over their relevant documents (usually their driving licence) and it is at this juncture that the 
opportunity for a bribe emerges. The official may decide to prevent or delay onward carriage 
of the goods unless a bribe is paid. 37 Foltz and Bromley note that there were over 1,000 truck 
trips in 4 countries for the period 2006 to 2009. There were 27,990 useable stops for 919 
drivers during these trips. Their data shows that 90% of the stops led to a bribe payment 
suggesting some of the locations represented a ‘captive market’. 38  It is clear that the 
bureaucratic process consisting of many checkpoints, the checking of licences by those 
manning the checkpoints,  and the lack of alternative means of carrying the goods to the 
countries involved provide the right environment for demanding bribes. 
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The utilities sector is another area where citizens face high levels of corruption. The review of 
corruption in the water sector by Butterworth and de la Harpe39 shows how monopoly, low-
paid front level staff and poor contract management in Kenya, for instance, result in over 
invoicing or under reporting of daily sales to water vendors, tampering with water meters and 
illegal connections. 40  
 
One of the clearest examples of petty corruption in action comes with the administration of 
land in India, which may involve more than one government department. TII have recently 
suggested that bribery in land services is particularly prevalent where one in five people have 
reported that they have had to pay a bribe for a land service.41 In India land titles have to be 
registered to allow for the obtaining of credit and for the effective use of land. This process of 
registration is managed by each Indian state and is handled directly by the revenue and 
registration departments. At a number of bureaucratic levels the opportunity for bribery is 
apparent42 because the wide-ranging uses of land, including sale, purchase, registration and 
partition can require a visit to both the registration and revenue departments. TII’s study of 
corruption in 2008 indicates that of the 18% of the group identified who visited the 
Department of Registration, 51% experienced corrupt practices. Interestingly the levels of 
corruption were deemed unchanged or worse in 88% of the respondents who felt they had 
experienced some form of corruption.  
 
The experiences of a farmer,  Dhaula Ram, cited in the TII study provides a typical example. 
The farmer owned a small agricultural holding in Shai Pur who wished to obtain a bank loan 
to increase productivity on the farm. For this he had to obtain the land record document. He 
visited the revenue office four times and it was only on the fifth occasion when he paid a 
bribe was he able to obtain the record, some two hours later. 43  This and other stories are 
vividly considered in this survey and it becomes apparent, when looking at service providers’ 
perspectives, the existence of two separate departments (revenue and registration) to deal with 
land queries appear to provide a duplication of opportunity for corrupt practices. 44  
 
Most of the surveys we have cited in this article also indicate that law enforcement is a key 
area for bribery.45 Ahmed and Ahmed who undertook a case study of slum areas in Karachi46 
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indicate that police corruption is highly prevalent. Historically, the police mechanism is 
described by the researchers as ‘well organised, competent, proficient and honest’47 but in the 
last ten years the police have remained at the top of the ladder of corruption in various 
perception studies.48 According to their survey 45% of the 485 respondents  claimed to have 
visited their local police station. And of these, 78% said they had experienced some form of 
corruption. Their study examines the different levels of corruption through the different 
hierarchies of the police force. They suggest that the duty police officer is the most corrupt 
office within the police where nearly forty three percent of the respondents claimed they had 
to pay a bribe. The verification officer would appear to be the least corrupt with the traffic 
police and investigating officers coming somewhere in between. The data from this study 
suggests that the highest amount of monies were paid to avoid false arrest and to get released 
from false arrest. 49 When considering the reasons for corruption the respondents stated that a 
lack of accountability and a lack of transparency were the overriding factors here. The actor 
directly involved nearly always demands the bribe. 50  
 
Transparency or the openness of procedures and the decision making processes within public 
services is widely recognized as central to reducing corruption. The reason for promoting 
transparency is that it leaves little room for the public official to exercise his discretion 
without clarifying or justifying his decisions thus bringing with it accountability.   Both 
transparency and accountability are  therefore  important factors to make inroads into fighting 
corruption. 
 
As stated early poor wages in the public sector is also a contributory factor. The question of 
poor wages however is a factor that is entirely dependent on affordability and is closely 
related to economic prosperity. Part of the reason for poor wages in some countries (mostly 
developing) is lack of public funds, and this lack is attributable due to a number of factors 
ranging from poor tax administration (due to corruption at both the petty and grand level), a 
thriving shadow economy,51 to misuse of development funds by the political elite and the 
resulting lack of infrastructure. As for the simplifying the bureaucratic structures and 
introducing transparency and accountability the use of Information Technology (IT) has been 
heralded as the panacea.  The surveys from India and Ghana that we have cited in this paper 
see IT as a means of introducing transparency and accountability in the public services thus 
helping towards reducing petty corruption. Before we consider IT as an antidote to corruption 
in the following section we would like to briefly consider the impact the link between petty 
corruption and development in order to show that petty corruption also affects development 
just as grand corruption. 
 
B. Petty Corruption and Development 
 
As stated in the introduction petty corruption remains an under researched area even though 
there are numerous in-depth studies on corruption in the past ten years written by economists, 
political scientists and lawyers. Most of these studies concentrate on grand corruption, that is 
corruption between the private sector (mostly multi—national corporations  (MNCs)) and 
high-ranking public officials and the political elite. This may be because it is commonly 
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 Ibid. p 79.  
48
 See Transparency International Pakistan 2010.  
49
 Ahmed R and Ahmed QM (2012) ‘Petty Corruption in the Police Department, A Case Study of Slum 
Areas of Karachi’ Developing Country Studies, 2(6): 83.   
50
 Ibid. p 83.  
51
 See ‘Exploring the Relationships between Corruption and Tax Revenue ‘available at 
http://www.u4.no/publications/exploring-the-relationships-between-corruption-and-tax-
revenue/#sthash.WBKU0fYN.dpuf  ’ 
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believed that the small amounts of money involved in petty corruption and the effect felt by 
the common man is unlikely to make an impact on development. This belief can be criticized 
immediately. First, widespread petty corruption undermines the quality of public services in 
the state and this in turn affects living standards and human development.  According to 
Behórquez and Devrim ‘a well functioning delivery of quality public services, consistent with 
citizen’s needs and preference is crucial for a high level of human development, for the 
effectiveness of public expenditure as well as to maintain citizen’s trust in public 
institutions’.52 Whilst petty corruption may involve small amounts if one were to aggregate 
the amounts they run into millions. For instance, TII in their 2008 survey estimated the cost of 
petty corruption in BPL households in the previous year to be INR 8,830 million. This is a 
huge monetary cost and if the costs of petty corruption to the non-poor are added then this 
makes a huge dent that is likely to impact on development of local communities and states. It 
can also be said that petty corruption is a kind of ‘taxation’ on those seeking services which 
ultimately does not reach the state and instead enters the shadow (underground) economy thus 
undermining the nation’s GDP. 
 
What is also not realized by those studying corruption and economic development is that 
petty corruption can deter foreign investors. Support for this view comes from the studies that 
have focused on petty corruption. Foltz and Bromley,53 in their study of trucking in Ghana 
considered in the previous section, explain that whilst there is no data for the destination of 
the bribe received what does become apparent though is that there tends to be a reduction of 
1-2% in trade and this in turn deters foreign direct investment (FDI). 54  The review of petty 
corruption in the water sector recognizes that incidences of bribery, embezzlement and theft 
and the abuse of discretion that feature in what are seen as a ‘type of corruption that pervades 
developing countries with weak governance systems.’ 55 do ‘dampen donor confidence’56 thus 
impacting upon investment in the sector. So, it seems that it is not just grand corruption that 
impedes economic investment by foreign investors in a country. Petty corruption (which does 
not share the trappings of grand corruption in monetary exchange or status of the actors 
involved) also contributes to poor economic and human development. 57 Against this context 
our view is that it makes good sense to study the phenomenon of petty corruption alongside 
grand corruption to enable and promote economic development within a state. 
 
C. IT as an Antidote 
 
The reason for the promotion of IT is that it is perceived as having the potential to introduce 
transparency and remove the element of discretion that public officials have. This suggested 
use of IT in the context of fighting corruption sits within the broader framework of 
Information and Communications Technology for Development (ICT4D). Like the Industrial 
Revolution,58  IT is viewed as an enabler of social transformation for the better 59 and as 
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 Behórquez E and Devrim D (2012) ‘Cracking the Myth of Petty Bribery’ Noted Internacionals CIDOB 
51, March:1. 
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 Foltz JD and Bromley DW  (2012) fn 36, p,1.  
54
 Ibid. p, 16.   
55
 Butterworth J and de la Harpe J , fn 39. 
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 Ibid, p 3.   
56
 Ibid, p 24.  
57
 See Asiedu E and Freeman J (2008) ‘The Effect of Corruption on Investment Growth: Evidence from 
Firms in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Transition Countries’ available at 
http://www2.ku.edu/~kuwpaper/2008Papers/200802.pdf; Freckleton M, Wright AS & Craigwell R (2010) 
‘Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Growth And Corruption In Developing Economies’ available at 
http://www.ccmf-uwi.org/files/publications/conference/2010/8_1-Freckleton_Wright_Craigwell-p.pdf . 
58
 Refers to the period 1760 – 1850  when fundamental changes in the manufacturing processes took 
place as result of new technologies and techniques that brought about increased productivity and 
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playing a major role in all aspects of human life from managing manmade disasters, 
strengthening human security,  building resilience, commerce, education and health to 
empowerment of women and inevitably citizen-state relationships and transactions (often 
termed e-governance).  Of course all this assumes that the state has the necessary technical 
and legal infrastructure to take advantage of the many opportunities that IT may provide of 
engaging and serving the citizens and that there is a high level of general literacy and  IT 
literacy amongst the population. These are pending problematic issues but it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to delve deeper into these problematic aspects and possible solutions.60 
 
In the context of public services it makes sense to use IT to make available various 
application forms for services such as passports, visa, utilities and taxes and other information 
relating to processes and procedures to be followed to obtain the public services. Using 
technology in this way has the immediate effect of reducing opportunities for petty corruption 
that manifests itself at the very first stages of accessing services.  This, in practical terms.  
means that they do not have pay bribes to public officials to obtain the forms or to even 
establish which department or section within a ministry deals with the services required by 
the citizen.  Bhatnagar in his Report on the economic and social impact of e-governance states 
that IT introduces transparency at every level, from access to rules and procedures through to 
decisions and actions and removes the discretion element away from the bureaucrats thus 
taking away the enabling feature for soliciting bribes. 61  
 
The surveys conducted by TII and Ghana Integrity Initiative also are of the view that IT can 
improve governance and thus reduce corruption. The TII survey recommends e-Governance 
‘to provide SIMPLE, MORAL, ACCOUNTABLE, RESPONSIVE and TRANSPARENT, 
i.e., SMART 62  Government. The resulting benefits are less corruption, transparency, 
paperless offices, greater convenience, revenue growth and/or cost effectiveness’. 63  They 
define e-governance as ‘an electronic delivery of government services to citizens, business 
and other external consumers of such services in a reliable, timely and transparent manner, 
rather than computerization of one department or the other.’ 64  The Ghana survey also 
recommends that ‘the use of Information, Communications and Technology (ICT), including 
biometric and online processing of documents such as taxpayer registration and payment of 
taxes, business registration, passport processing, etc. will further enhance the fight against 
corruption as it reduces human contact and speeds up things.’65 The recommendations see 
transparency as an important characteristic of the use of IT in the provision of public services.  
 
However for e-governance projects to succeed, according to Patnaik et al,66 people, process 
                                                                                                                                                              
greater efficiency. For more on the Industrial Revolution see Trinder B (2013) Britain’s Industrial 
Revolution Lancaster: Carnegie Publishing.    
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available at http://www.iceg.net/2008/books/3.pdf ) 
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and technology are equally important.  Technology of itself is insufficient for e-governance 
success.67 According to these researchers the successful execution of an e-governance project 
needs to address the following factors:68 
 
(a) Application characteristics – that takes into account the working style of the government 
and department, language (especially in a multi-lingual nation), target groups and mission 
critical application69.  
 
(b) System characteristics – that takes into account rigidness/flexibility (since government 
functions cannot be easily modified), tightly defined user-specifications and integration of 
multiple systems (software, hardware etc.) across  and within department(s)’government to 
ensure homogeneity. Adaptability to challenges posed by new technology is also an important 
factor to be considered. Further automation of all offices within the department from the 
lowest to the highest is also required to capture all data thus reducing the possibility of human 
intervention errors. 
 
(c) Project management – covering cost, resources and uncertainties created by changes in 
technology from the planning to execution of the project. 
 
(d) Personnel characteristics – to include political leaders, administrators/bureaucrats, 
consultants/vendors, developers, user departments and citizens. 
 
(e) Risk management – addressing both controlled risks (such as technological, managerial, 
political and economical) and uncontrollable risks (such as global challenges). 
 
India has embraced e-governance with enthusiasm and over the past ten years a number of e-
governance schemes have been set up by different states. They are too numerous to deal with 
here but the one that stands out and widely cited as showing a high level of success (in the 
sense of reducing corruption) is the Bhoomi project.70 The project was initiated in 199971 in 
the southern Indian state of Karnataka and focuses on simplifying the process for obtaining 
land records. As stated earlier land records are essential for farmers  to obtain loans and 
receive agricultural related subsidies for seeds and fertilizers. This project automated around 
20 million land titles belonging to 6.7 million farmers. Kiosks were set up to access these 
records and the farmer can now obtain the Record of Rights, Tenancy and Crops (RTC) 
online by paying a sum of INR 15. This in contrast to the past when it took between 3-30 days 
to get the certificate, which was dependent on the amount of bribes paid. According to Pathak 
and Prasad  ‘the cost to farmers have come down considerably as 84%  of the users had to 
make only one visit to get the service .…The most important benefit is that corruption had 
come down from 66% to less than 3%. The Bhoomi project saved the farmers INR 804 
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 Ibis p, 35. 
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 This is a brief summary. For more discussion of these characteristics and details such as networking 
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 For more on the Bhoomi project http://www.bhoomi.karnataka.gov.in/landrecordsonweb/about.htm.  
The Bhoomi project was preceded by pilot projects in the early 1990s. There are also other schemes 
such as Saukaryam (in Andhra Pradesh) relating to municipal services for citizens, which can be 
accessed via kiosks in civic centres or through websites. It covers all municipal services such as birth 
and death certificates, applying for building plan approvals and checking tax dues and payment of these 
online.  It is said have benefited the citizens greatly by removing corruption and have also helped the 
municipal corporation in the collection of taxes (see Pathak, R D and Prasad, RS (2005) ‘Role of E-
Governance in Tackling Corruption and Achieving Societal Harmony – Indian Experience’  Beijing: 
Network of Asia-Pacific Schools and Institutes of  Public Administration and Governance (NAPSIPAG) 
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million in bribes and INR 66 million in wages annually’.72 
 
The above seems an encouraging story in combating petty corruption and improving the 
quality of public services. Patnaik et al also state that Bhoomi is an illustration of successful 
governance and they attribute this success to the project meeting all the characteristics 
outlined above. Table 1 below lists how these characteristics were reflected in the Bhoomi 
project. They are also of the view Bhoomi benefitted the citizens greatly since the 
characteristics were taken care of directly and indirectly. According to them post Bhoomi it 
takes only 5-30 minutes to obtain an RTC whereas under the old manual system it took 3 – 30 
days. Similarly the speed of service for obtaining mutation73 is fast, it now takes 35 days 
under the current system whereas in the old system it took 200 days. While the number of 
land records were very low in pre-Bhoomi days post Bhoomi 14 million records were 
distributed. There has also been a phenomenal increase in the number of mutations, from very 
low figures to 1.6 million due to the Bhoomi Project. 74 
 
Table 1: Bhoomi Project Characteristics, derived from Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 in Patnaik et al (citing Chethana 2007) 
Characteristics for Successful E-Governance  Bhoomi Project 
Application Characteristics  
• Unique Working Style  
 
 
• Language  
 
• Target group 
• Mission Critical Application 
 
• Unique for Karnataka; will require 
customization for use in other states. 
• Regional language, Kannada,  used 
• All citizens 
 
• Land records very sensitive and critical 
application 
 
System Characteristics 
• Rigidness 
 
 
• User specification 
• Integration needs 
• Challenges (Technology) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Architecture  
 
 
• Strict following of land records procedures, 
manuals and statutes 
• Closely followed 
• 3 months for integration 
• Hardware and Networking, Software 
development and digitization of 20 million 
records 
• 177 Taluks (ie groups of villages organized for 
revenue purposes) and 203 kiosks developed 
• Multi tier (n-tier) architecture used for client-
server architecture 
Project Management 
• Time 
• Cost 
 
• 2 years (20000 man months) 
• INR 200000000 
Personnel Characteristics 
• Political Leaders 
 
• Administrators 
 
 
• Officials 
 
• Developers 
• Citizens 
 
 
• Chief Minister of Karnataka & Union Minister 
for IT 
• Commissioner of land Records & 
Administrators of Revenue Department 
• 2000 officials and 10000 Village Assistants 
• Software Development Team 
• Public 
Risk Management 
• Technical Risk 
 
• Paper records in poor condition, volume and 
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• Managerial Risk  
 
• Political Risk 
 
• Behavioural Risk 
sensitive nature of data and using biometric 
finger print 
• Complexity of project and number of people 
involved 
• Both internal and external politics involved 
• Initial reluctance of village accountants 
 
The picture painted by the various studies on the Bhoomi project referred to in this paper 
imparts a warm glow of having resolved the inconveniences and petty corruption faced by the 
ordinary citizens of Karnataka. If this were really the case then it must be applauded for being 
a resounding success in combating corruption. But there is dark side to this story of success as 
the following study shows.  
 
Benjamin et al75 based on their fieldwork76 are of the view that Bhoomi has not improved 
efficiency or transparency and is indeed it is a breeding ground for corruption and 
exploitation of the small farmers by the political and business elite.  Pre Bhoomi obtaining an 
RTC77 or a mutation took 2-3 days. Now it takes longer since they are not available at the 
village level through village accountants (VAs). According to one small farmer ‘the work 
could be “fast and efficient” in an emergency’ with local VAs. After Bhoomi, all categories of 
landowners feel that any significant change like a mutation takes 3-4 months. This becomes 
all the more problematic due to the dependence of the farmers on agents. Often, if farmers 
visit the taluk78 office (and lose their day’s work), they may find that either the computer is 
down or that there is a power cut.’79  
 
Benjamin et al also highlight that that a lot of complications arise also due to the misspelling 
of names on the register. This is likely to have happened when entering details onto the 
computer system. To rectify the information (known as  khata80 change) many visits to the 
taluk office are required which the farmers can ill afford time wise thus enabling the return of 
middlemen (agents) in the process and creating the opportunities for bribes. Many of the 
farmers interviewed in this study indicated that bribes had increased substantially, this in spite 
of the preventive First In First Out (FIFO) measure  built into the system. The FIFO places 
the applications in a queue that have to be cleared in sequence. If the application is not 
cleared within the time lime limit allocated the application moves up to higher officer. The 
intention behind this mechanism is to prevent bribes. According to Benjamin et al local 
officials did not find FIFO a great hindrance. For instance, the study cites a case where the 
mutation process only took under an hour despite ‘time limits for “public display and 
information”’ due to the powerful interest behind the mutation.81 Given their findings which 
goes against the hitherto positively glowing reports on reduction of petty corruption due to the  
Bhoomi the researchers following their initial survey decided to survey a further two taluks. 
While mainly rural, one of the taluks was known for better quality agricultural land and 
horticulture and the other was economically depressed with the exception a large auto-
manufacturing plant set up by an MNC. The findings were no different in  these taluks. 
Bribery was still an issue. Interestingly the interviewees thought that increased corruption was 
attributable to the centralization of the functions brought about by digitization. Previously 
they could engage with local officials at the village level like the VA and as a community 
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could exercise pressure on the local officials and also negotiate the bribes to be paid to an 
affordable level driven by local relationships and dynamics. However with the move of the 
land services from the village to the taluk level this is not possible since ‘the process involves 
four administrative layers, or ‘tables’ as they termed it: the VA, the RI [Revenue Inspector], 
the [administrative officers in charge of revenue collection] Siresdhar, and the 
Thasildar/82Computer centre … In the post- Bhoomi period, … the process is dominated by a 
network and system of various ‘agents’ who have set a ‘market rate’, and systematized 
bribing to make it all pervasive, especially in taluks experiencing rapid development’.83  
 
Banjamin et al  provide a useful table which sets out the time taken for RTC, Mutation  and 
Rectification (Katha change) and the bribes to be paid which varies according to the 
economic characteristics of the taluk. It is not possible to go through the extensive table in 
detail here.84 By way of illustration, in villages belonging to a relatively less urbanising taluk 
in pre-Bhoomi days the cost of a RTC was INR 5 to 100 and the services were provided 
immediately. The service post-Bhoomi takes 2-3 months and costs INR 15+35 and expenses 
of INR 100 for agent to visit the taluk office. Bribes are on a transaction basis. In an 
urbanized taluk in pre-Bhoomi days the cost for an RTC was INR 3-50 and the services were 
provided immediately whereas post-Bhoomi it is INR 15 and INR 100 for processing by an 
agent. It can go up to INR 300 where a correction is required. The bribes are on an acre basis 
and the land market is dominated by investors from neighbouring states and large developers 
that cater to Non-Resident Indians (NRI) and IT firms. In some areas, bribes vary depending 
on whether the service is required by a local or an outsider. For instance, to obtain a khata 
change post-Bhoomi in a taluk with high value horticulture the bribes range between INR 1 – 
2,000 and for an outsider between INR 6-7,000. As is obvious from these few illustrations 
that the dynamics of the bribe transaction are quite complex and reflect various factors, from 
the perceived affordability of the bribe-giver to the status of the applicants.   
 
There is another disturbing finding highlighted by the researchers. It seems that the 
centralization of records is being utilized by the powerful for their own benefit and to the 
detriment of the small farmer. Small farmers interviewed reported that ‘the centralization of 
and computerization of records had allowed their survey numbers to be used by large and 
middle level farmers to access government schemes and benefits like “small farmer” 
subsidies, seeds, fertilizers and pesticides and plants’.85 Further the power dynamics between 
administrative and political players affect the titles of small farmers largely aided by the 
centralization process. Benjamin et al state that  ‘since the late 1990s, large players have 
dominated the peripheral land markets ….Such players are able to draw on their links to 
the judicial and administrative elite, often in the form of “partnerships”, to consolidate 
land belonging to small and marginal farmers and to regularize titles in their favor. In 
light of these structural issues, not only does the question of bribes or time taken fade into 
relative insignificance, but management efforts such as FIFO are hardly effective, and the 
Bhoomi kiosk, and its back office, hardly presents a hurdle. Likewise, given the ‘turn-
key’ nature of processing carried out by skilled lawyers with administrative and political 
backing, a ‘technical fix’, or hardware and software updates, is unlikely to resolve the 
issue. On the contrary, our respondents mentioned that the relative ease with which 
information is now centrally available via the Bhoomi program only facilitates the 
process. To the extent that information is available centrally, there is loss of information 
locally, and with it is rendered ineffective the claiming process by small and marginal 
farmers.’86 
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What is made clear from the Benjamin et al study is that Bhoomi has not been successful. 
Instead of solving the petty corruption problem it may have created more opportunities for 
public officials and the powerful elite to obtain undue benefits adding to the woes of the small 
farmer who is dependent on his small landholding for his livelihood. So digitization and 
technical fixes such as FIFO to prevent corruption have not made the kind of inroads 
expected of them. While FIFO may have targeted the corrupt officials it seems they have 
found ways of getting round the mechanisms and to use digitization in a manner that would 
benefit them personally. At the end of the day the attempt to remove the element of discretion 
and bring in greater transparency and efficiency to a system through the use of IT does not 
seem to have achieved  the intended objective. 
 
One must also question whether IT can live up to the high expectations especially of it in 
countries with a low literacy level. This is particularly pertinent to developing countries. Low 
levels of literacy means low levels of digital literacy. In these circumstances, more often than 
not citizens  will require the services of  middlemen (agents) with close relationships to public 
officials thus promoting corrupt practices. Alternatively the citizen may turn to the public 
official for help to access the public service thus creating opportunities for bribery. To 
prevent corruption it is essential for states to also focus on increasing literacy levels amongst 
the poor by ensuring that all have access to education including the use of digital technology 
for accessing basic services. This  inevitably will take time.  
 
So apart from educating the public what else is required to prevent petty corruption?  An 
important factor that is omitted in most of the anti-corruption literature is the education of 
public officials that instill basic values that would make them aware of the detrimental impact 
of corruption on the infrastructure and their own contribution to this detrimental impact 
through their participation in soliciting bribes and taking bribes. Equally there needs to be a 
firm commitment on the part of politicians and the private sector to not engage in corrupt 
behaviour. Equally citizens will have to also commit themselves to refrain from paying petty 
bribes and not view it as a necessary ‘informal’ tax for obtaining public services. It must be 
pointed out that the UNCAC in Art 7(d) requires States Parties to ‘promote education and 
training programmes to enable them to meet the requirements for the correct, honourable and 
proper performance of public functions and that provide them with specialized and 
appropriate training to enhance their awareness of the risks of corruption inherent in the 
performance of their functions.’ As to how far these are implemented by the States Parties is 
unclear. Article 13 of the UNCAC also places emphasis on participation of society and in 
para  (c) promotes  ‘undertaking public information activities that contribute to non- tolerance 
of corruption, as well as public education programmes, including school and university 
curricula.’ Civil Society Organisations across the world continuously engage in this process 
using various methods such as hotlines for anonymous reporting of bribery, songs and  street 
theatre. In the context of the states of South India the work of a CSO named 5th Pillar has 
been gathering popularity. Known as the Zero Rupee Note movement it encourages citizens 
to show their Zero Rupee Note87 (issues and distributed by 5th Pillar) when a public official 
demands a bribe thus ‘making a strong statement condemning bribery’.88  
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Figure 1: Zero Rupee Note (for use in Karnataka) as issued by 5th Pillar. 
 
 
 
 
As for IT, without question, it has the potential to make services efficient and transparent to 
some degree. However the change for the better (lowering petty corruption)  will happen only 
when the people change their ways of dealing and that requires a change in their conduct. We 
cannot expect IT to bring about this change without honest human participation and their 
desire to bring about changes in their transactions for the benefit of society as a whole. We 
have started engaging with this process through a variety of measures ranging from changes 
in legislation and raising awareness to introducing transparency in public services through the 
use of IT. However for integrity to firmly take root in a society we need to instill the value of 
acting for the greater good of society in all. 
Conclusion 
 
This paper focused on the under researched phenomenon of petty corruption involving low 
level public officials and citizens who access public services such as utilities, schools, health 
care. Using illustrations we showed how bureaucratic procedures can provide opportunities 
for petty corruption and how IT has the potential to infuse transparency into bureaucratic 
processes. We focused on a much acclaimed e-governance project in India, Bhoomi, and 
based on surveys of the project concluded that it has not been a success. The lack of success 
is not because of the technology. It can without doubt introduce transparency and efficiency. 
It is the people part e-governance that lets the project down. As long as public officials are 
motivated by private gain and abuse their public office, solicitation of bribes and the giving of 
bribes will continue. This is not the fault of IT.  
 
 
 
